Two Texts, Three Questions: 2025-2026

Over the course of their studies at the Straus Center, Straus Scholars are encouraged to pursue their own intellectual interests and explore new connections between Torah and Western thought. The Straus Center's initiative "Two Texts, Three Questions," led by our rabbinic intern, is designed to promote this type of intellectual exploration. Each Straus Scholar selects two texts, one each related to Torah and Western thought, and asks three questions about those sources.

Tzipora Einbinder explores how Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Ralph Waldo Emerson engaged with science through excerpts from Soloveitchik’s The Lonely Man of Faith and Emerson’s The American Scholar.

The American Scholar, Page 4 (Ralph Waldo Emerson)

It presently learns, that, since the dawn of history, there has been a constant accumulation and classifying of facts. But what is classification but the perceiving that these objects are not chaotic, and are not foreign, but have a law which is also a law of the human mind? The astronomer discovers that geometry, a pure abstraction of the human mind, is the measure of planetary motion. The chemist finds proportions and intelligible method throughout matter; and science is nothing but the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote parts. The ambitious soul sits down before each refractory fact; one after another, reduces all strange constitutions, all new powers, to their class and their law, and goes on for ever to animate the last fibre of organization, the outskirts of nature, by insight.

The Lonely Man of Faith, Page 27 (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik)

This dichotomy cancels the intimacy and immediacy from one's relationship with God and renders the personal approach to God complicated and difficult. God, as the cosmic ruler, is beheld in His boundless majesty reigning supreme over creation, His will crystallized in the natural law, His word determining the behavioral patterns of nature. He is everywhere but at the same time above and outside of everything. When man who just beheld God’s presence turns around to address himself to the Master of creation in the intimate accents of the "Thou," he finds the Master and Creator gone, enveloped in the cloud of mystery, winking to him from the awesome "beyond."

1. Emerson famously was ordained as a minister before leaving organized religion in favor of general religiosity flavored by transcendentalism. Are there references to spirituality in this text? If there are, how might Emerson’s experiences have affected his philosophy here?
2. On what does Rabbi Soloveitchik predicate man’s relationship with G-d, and for what reason(s)?
3. How do Rabbi Soloveitchik and Emerson relate to engaging in the sciences? Where do they agree, and where do they disagree?

Adina Feldman shares sections from Rambam’s Hilchot Mamrim (Laws of Rebels‎) and Plato’s Apology of Socrates, analyzing the different approaches each text takes on the subject of “the Rebellious Elder.”

Hilchot Mamrim 3:4 (Rambam)

The "rebellious elder" mentioned in the Torah, by contrast, is one of the sages of Israel who has received the tradition from previous sages and who analyzes and issues ruling with regard to the words of Torah as do all the sages of Israel. His rebellion involves an instance when he has a difference of opinion in one of the Torah's laws with the Supreme Sanhedrin and did not accept their views, but instead issued a ruling to act in a different manner. The Torah decreed that he should be executed. He should confess his sin before being executed so that he will be granted a portion in the world to come. Even though he analyzes and they analyze; he received the tradition and they received the tradition, the Torah granted them deference. Even if the court desires to forgo their honor and allow him to live, they are not allowed so that differences of opinion will not arise within Israel.

Apology of Socrates (Plato)

I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to be slightly more wise than him…. Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death; if, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, the god orders me to fulfill the philosopher’s mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death: then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good.

1. How did Socrates see his role as the heterodox, and how does that conflict with how the Sanhedrin viewed the Rebellious Elder?
2. In his apology, Socrates suggests that Athens should not put him to death but actually pay him to continue asking questions, as it is beneficial to society. According to the Rambam, the Sanhedrin is not allowed to let a Rebellious Elder live, even if they would like to – why do you think this is? What drives the fundamental disagreement between Socrates and Rambam as to whether this kind of figure is beneficial or harmful to society?
3. Socrates attributes his “unique form of wisdom” to his asking of questions. Does this make him more or less similar to the Rebellious Elder?

Matthew Minsk examines American and Jewish legal sources discussing quasi-judicial proceedings in which the accusation would severely damage the reputation of the accused. 

Rabbi Nissim (Ran), Ketubot 1a (on the Rif)

[If the accuser is believed in his accusation,] she would be permitted even without testifying, but once there have been suspicions cast, we want to establish the truth of the matter because perhaps the matter will be clarified and witnesses will come. However, if the accuser isn’t believed to state his accusation, we don’t engage on the topic at all; on the contrary, we don’t let him testify at all so that he doesn’t make insinuations about her.

Rabbi Yom Tov ben Abraham of Seville (Ritva), Ketubot  10a

And if you will ask: Aren’t we concerned that punishing him for his testimony [either because his accusation isn’t believed so we treat it as slandering, or because he could only be trusted to make such an accusation if he had previously committed improper actions] will stop him from coming to testify, and as a result he will continue committing forbidden acts? You can answer that the rabbis understood that anyone with such an accusation will not hold back from testifying just because of potential punishment.

Saifullah Khan v. Yale University, et al., 347 Conn. 1, 3, 295 A.3d 855 (2023)

[T]his court explained that a quasi-judicial proceeding is one in which the entity conducting the proceeding has the power of discretion in applying the law to the facts within a framework that contains procedural protections against defamatory statements, and that courts charged with determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature may consider… any other factors that are relevant to the particular proceeding, including whether there are procedural safeguards in place to ensure the reliability of the information presented at the proceeding and the authority of the entity to regulate the proceeding, and courts must carefully scrutinize whether there is a sound public policy justification for affording absolute immunity in any given context…

1. How do the Ran and the Ritva take different approaches to encouraging or discouraging testimony that the court won’t be able to accept as legally valid?
2. On Page 13 of Khan v. Yale University, the Connecticut Supreme Court explains that the rule that testimony in the context of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings receives absolute immunity from countersuits of slander dates back to English common law. How does the court balance the goal of this immunity—to allow plaintiffs or victims the ability to make accusations without fear—with protecting the reputation of the accused against false accusations?

3. Both the Jewish and American legal sources describe quasi-judicial proceedings (in the case of the Ran and Ritva, because the court can’t actually accept the accuser’s testimony, it doesn’t serve a strictly legal purpose) in which the accusation would severely damage the reputation of the accused. How do the respective legal systems seek to balance the search for justice with concerns about needless slander? How do they respectively weigh the accusers’ (different) interests in determining truth?
    

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Ateret Tollinksy examines service of God in relation to those with disabilities through the lens of John Milton and Rav Moshe Feinstein. 

Sonnet 19: When I consider how my light is spent (John Milton)

When I consider how my light is spent,
  Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide,
  And that one Talent which is death to hide
  Lodged with me useless, though my Soul more bent
To serve therewith my Maker, and present
  My true account, lest he returning chide;
  “Doth God exact day-labour, light denied?”
  I fondly ask. But patience, to prevent
That murmur, soon replies, “God doth not need
  Either man’s work or his own gifts; who best
  Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best. His state
Is Kingly. Thousands at his bidding speed
  And post o’er Land and Ocean without rest:
  They also serve who only stand and wait.”

Igrot Moshe Yoreh De’ah 4:29 (Rabbi Moshe Feinstein)

Therefore, it is certainly an obligation upon the parents to teach [the children] as much as they are able, including hiring a teacher to teach them, and also to establish an institution if there are many such children. Additionally, it is an obligation upon other individuals to help with tzedakah (charity) in such cases. However, one who has no understanding or awareness, whether permanently or even temporarily—who does not learn with others and is exempt from mitzvot not due to insanity but due to compulsion—is not included in the general commandment to educate. Nevertheless, the parents are obligated to prevent him from transgressing prohibitions as much as they are able. But to say that there is an obligation to teach him like a normal child—this does not apply. Even a young toddler (pa’utot) who has no understanding at all is not included in the general obligation. This seems to be implied from what is written in Orach Chaim 343, and it is considered the same as a shoteh (legally insane person) when he has no understanding whatsoever. However, when he has some understanding, even if it is at the level of a toddler, he is obligated in all the mitzvot. And regarding when they come to the synagogue—certainly the community must receive them with a pleasant countenance, even those who have no understanding, and show them that we answer Amen and Kedushah, and also try to get them to fulfill whatever they can — whether for their own sake or for the sake of honoring the Torah. And bringing them to the synagogue itself is a mitzvah, both for the sake of the Torah and for the honor of their parents. I have already explained this thoroughly in Orach Chaim, Part 2, Siman 88, that it is not forbidden by law to place them in an institution, and when there is no other option—there is no prohibition under state law to place them in such a setting. But there is no obligation to do so in a home setting, nor to keep them there for treatment in any specific manner, and there is no obligation for others to provide such treatment. Therefore, since you have raised this important matter—it is certainly proper that you begin organizing a school for them, and to find suitable teachers for these students who are obligated to learn. And may Hashem, blessed be He, be with your endeavors.

1. How do Milton and Rav Moshe Feinstein differ in their definitions of service of God?
2. What can be learned from Rav Moshe Feinstein’s emphasis on the job of the community in assisting those with disabilities?
3. While both Milton and Rav Moshe Feinstein discuss the concept of service of God related to individuals with disabilities, they approach the topic from different angles, with Rav Moshe Feinstein writing in a teshuva and Milton being blind himself. What can one learn from these differing perspectives?

Tamara Yeshurun investigates the nature of man by comparing selections from Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan and the Book of Genesis.

Hobbes' Leviathan, Chapter XIII 

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. 

Hobbes' Leviathan, Chapter XVII 

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants.

Genesis 6:11-13

The earth became corrupt before God; the earth was filled with lawlessness. When God saw how corrupt the earth was, for all flesh had corrupted its ways on earth, God said to Noah, "I have decided to put an end to all flesh, for the earth is filled with lawlessness because of them: I am about to destroy them with the earth.

Genesis 11:1-8

Everyone on earth had the same language and the same words. And as they migrated from the east, they came upon a valley in the land of Shinar and settled there. They said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks and burn them hard." —Brick served them as stone, and bitumen served them as mortar.— And they said, "Come, let us build us a city, and a tower with its top in the sky, to make a name for ourselves; else we shall be scattered all over the world." God came down to look at the city and tower that humanity had built, and God said, "If, as one people with one language for all, this is how they have begun to act, then nothing that they may propose to do will be out of their reach. Let us, then, go down and confound their speech there, so that they shall not understand one another's speech." Thus God scattered them from there over the face of the whole earth; and they stopped building the city.

1. According to each of these texts, who is man, if left to his own devices? How does civilization come into being?
2. Hobbes’ antidote to the nightmare of anarchy is the commonwealth. Why does God strike down the Tower of Babel (i.e., ostensibly the first ever commonwealth)? Is that not a return to the antediluvian condition? 
3. What is the role of Divine intervention in the story of man’s political existence?