Two Texts, Three Questions: 2025-2026

Over the course of their studies at the Straus Center, Straus Scholars are encouraged to pursue their own intellectual interests and explore new connections between Torah and Western thought. The Straus Center's initiative "Two Texts, Three Questions," led by our rabbinic intern, is designed to promote this type of intellectual exploration. Each Straus Scholar selects two texts, one each related to Torah and Western thought, and asks three questions about those sources.

Adina Feldman shares sections from Rambam’s Hilchot Mamrim (Laws of Rebels‎) and Plato’s Apology of Socrates, analyzing the different approaches each text takes on the subject of “the Rebellious Elder.”

Hilchot Mamrim 3:4 (Rambam)

The "rebellious elder" mentioned in the Torah, by contrast, is one of the sages of Israel who has received the tradition from previous sages and who analyzes and issues ruling with regard to the words of Torah as do all the sages of Israel. His rebellion involves an instance when he has a difference of opinion in one of the Torah's laws with the Supreme Sanhedrin and did not accept their views, but instead issued a ruling to act in a different manner. The Torah decreed that he should be executed. He should confess his sin before being executed so that he will be granted a portion in the world to come. Even though he analyzes and they analyze; he received the tradition and they received the tradition, the Torah granted them deference. Even if the court desires to forgo their honor and allow him to live, they are not allowed so that differences of opinion will not arise within Israel.

Apology of Socrates (Plato)

I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to be slightly more wise than him…. Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death; if, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, the god orders me to fulfill the philosopher’s mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death: then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good.

1. How did Socrates see his role as the heterodox, and how does that conflict with how the Sanhedrin viewed the Rebellious Elder?
2. In his apology, Socrates suggests that Athens should not put him to death but actually pay him to continue asking questions, as it is beneficial to society. According to the Rambam, the Sanhedrin is not allowed to let a Rebellious Elder live, even if they would like to – why do you think this is? What drives the fundamental disagreement between Socrates and Rambam as to whether this kind of figure is beneficial or harmful to society?
3. Socrates attributes his “unique form of wisdom” to his asking of questions. Does this make him more or less similar to the Rebellious Elder?

Ateret Tollinksy examines service of God in relation to those with disabilities through the lens of John Milton and Rav Moshe Feinstein. 

Sonnet 19: When I consider how my light is spent (John Milton)

When I consider how my light is spent,
  Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide,
  And that one Talent which is death to hide
  Lodged with me useless, though my Soul more bent
To serve therewith my Maker, and present
  My true account, lest he returning chide;
  “Doth God exact day-labour, light denied?”
  I fondly ask. But patience, to prevent
That murmur, soon replies, “God doth not need
  Either man’s work or his own gifts; who best
  Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best. His state
Is Kingly. Thousands at his bidding speed
  And post o’er Land and Ocean without rest:
  They also serve who only stand and wait.”

Igrot Moshe Yoreh De’ah 4:29 (Rav Moshe Feinstein)

Therefore, it is certainly an obligation upon the parents to teach [the children] as much as they are able, including hiring a teacher to teach them, and also to establish an institution if there are many such children. Additionally, it is an obligation upon other individuals to help with tzedakah (charity) in such cases. However, one who has no understanding or awareness, whether permanently or even temporarily—who does not learn with others and is exempt from mitzvot not due to insanity but due to compulsion—is not included in the general commandment to educate. Nevertheless, the parents are obligated to prevent him from transgressing prohibitions as much as they are able. But to say that there is an obligation to teach him like a normal child—this does not apply. Even a young toddler (pa’utot) who has no understanding at all is not included in the general obligation. This seems to be implied from what is written in Orach Chaim 343, and it is considered the same as a shoteh (legally insane person) when he has no understanding whatsoever. However, when he has some understanding, even if it is at the level of a toddler, he is obligated in all the mitzvot. And regarding when they come to the synagogue—certainly the community must receive them with a pleasant countenance, even those who have no understanding, and show them that we answer Amen and Kedushah, and also try to get them to fulfill whatever they can — whether for their own sake or for the sake of honoring the Torah. And bringing them to the synagogue itself is a mitzvah, both for the sake of the Torah and for the honor of their parents. I have already explained this thoroughly in Orach Chaim, Part 2, Siman 88, that it is not forbidden by law to place them in an institution, and when there is no other option—there is no prohibition under state law to place them in such a setting. But there is no obligation to do so in a home setting, nor to keep them there for treatment in any specific manner, and there is no obligation for others to provide such treatment. Therefore, since you have raised this important matter—it is certainly proper that you begin organizing a school for them, and to find suitable teachers for these students who are obligated to learn. And may Hashem, blessed be He, be with your endeavors.

1. How do Milton and Rav Moshe Feinstein differ in their definitions of service of God?
2. What can be learned from Rav Moshe Feinstein’s emphasis on the job of the community in assisting those with disabilities?
3. While both Milton and Rav Moshe Feinstein discuss the concept of service of God related to individuals with disabilities, they approach the topic from different angles, with Rav Moshe Feinstein writing in a teshuva and Milton being blind himself. What can one learn from these differing perspectives?