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Let's Not Make A Deal
Rabbi Joshua Lookstein
Obviously moved by the fantastic dream he had just dreamed, Ya'akov builds a monument out of the rock on which he slept, changes the name of the area where he stood, and vows a vow to end all vows. He was so excited about the circumstances, though, that the vow does not seem to follow the grammatical rules of a sentence, let alone a vow. "...If G-d will keep me in the way that I go, and will give me bread to eat and clothes to wear, and I will return in peace to my father's house, and G-d shall be my G-d, and this stone that I have made into a monument will be G-d's house, and of all that shall be given to me will I give you a tenth (Breishis 28:20-22)." Whereas a typical conditional vow would contain a condition and then a vow, here, because of the repetition of the Vav HaChibur, there seems only to be a series of conditions without the actual vow we had expected. Where is the vow? Where does the condition end and the vow begin?
A number of biblical commentators offer possible answers. According to Rashi the conditions conclude with, "...And G-d shall be my G-d," and the vow begins with, "This stone that I have made into a monument..." In Rashi's words, "Im Ta'aseh Li Es Eileh, Af Ani E'Eseh Zos, `ViHaEven HaZos Asher Samti Matzeivah...'" Others, namely Ramban, Sforno and Radak, disagree with Rashi. They contend that the conditions end earlier and thus the vow begins earlier. The conditions end after, "And I return in peace to my father's home," and the vow begins with, "G-d shall be my G-d." In the words of Ramban, "This (`And G-d shall be my G-d') is not a condition as Rashi would have it. It is rather a vow, and its purport is as follows,: "If I will return to my father's house, I will worship the proper Name of the Eternal in the Chosen Land..."
The conclusion of this last interpretation prompts Abarbanel to ask the following penetrating question, "How could Jacob act like those who serve upon the condition of receiving a reward, by saying, "If G-d will be with me and keep me and give me..." so and so, then he would accept Him as his G-d. Conversely, then, if He would not perform these things for him, He would not be his G-d and he would not serve him?"
Nechama Leibovitz, of blessed memory, offered an answer to this question. Maybe there is no deal being made, no serving in order to receive a reward, but rather Ya'akov was making a practical request. He wanted to make G-d his G-d. He wanted to erect a temple, but if he did not return safely, he would be unable to accomplish these goals. He needed G-d's help to ensure his safe passage. In effect he was saying to G-d, `Give me the possibility to serve you." Professor Leibovitz writes that this actually, "provides the archetype for future formulators of vows which are not menat to be commercial deals with the Almighty, but petitions for His help in granting man opportunity to give of himself, his life and his soul to G-d," and she cites Hannah as an example. If G-d would give her a son, she would give him to G-d, implying, "Give me so that I may give to you," similar to the request Ya'akov is making.
Rabbi Sampson Raphael Hirsch offers another answer which has relevance today as well. His interpretation of the verses is as follows, "If, in this struggle for existence, G-d protects and blesses people, then G-d reveals Himself as Hashem, in His Midas Rachamim...But it is only the Jewish conception which says, "ViHaya Hashem Li L'Elokim." According to Rabbi Hirsch, Ya’akov was not making a deal with G-d, he was making it clear to G-d that he understood the nature of his relationship with Him. Then G-d who showers all His love on me shall be, to me, in my mind, a G-d who not only gives, but who demands...to do homage to G-d, not merely as a Giver, but as a Law-giver, to make every breath that you take, every penny that you spend, in accordance with His directions. That is the meaning of, `ViHaya Hashem Li L'Elokim.'" Therefore, Ya'akov was not commercializing his behavior, but rather recognizing and ultimately emphasizing that a person's relationship with G-d is two-dimensional. We should not only be eager to receive what he provides for us, we should be zealous to observe what He legislates to us as well.
Not To Be Relied Upon For...
Menachem Schechter
The Tur al HaTorah raises a confounding problem. Dina, the daughter of Leah, seems to have married Shimon, her maternal and paternal brother. The Shaul ben HaCna’anis, recorded as a son of Shimon in Israel’s first census (Shmos 6,15), is identified by the Midrash as being the son of Dina, who was nivalah l’Cna’ani.. Unlike other incestuous relations, such as Amram marrying his aunt or Yaacov marrying sisters which may have only been effective post-Matan Torah, achoso me’imo is forbidden even to Bnei Noach.
This question, which had been left b’tzarich iyun, has recently resurfaced in a surprisingly relevant context. In a discussion of the complexities of surrogate motherhood, in which a fertilized egg is transferred from one womb to be born from another, Rabbi Yitzchak Dov Berger (Sridim, Av 5743), a member of the London Beis Din, quotes a Gadol Echad who attempted to justify Dina’s marriage. Rashi (Breishis 30,21) cites the Midrash that Leah’s seventh child was meant to be a son but was transmogrified to a girl in response to her prayers that Rachel beget two of the destined Twelve Tribes. Targum Yonasan ben Uziel writes that Rachel and Leah’s fetuses were swapped, rather than Leah’s having been transformed. According to this, Dina was conceived in Rachel’s womb but born to Leah. Shimon’s presumably permissible marriage to Dina must demonstrate that the mother of conception, not that of birth, determines yichus. Methodologically, Midrash bears little or no relevance to Halachic psak, however, and this proof is dismissed as a cute vort.
Coming and Going
Ari Schulman
This week's Parshah begins with the double phrase "Vayeitze Ya'akov MeBe'er Sheva Vayeilech Charanah." At first glance, the word Vayeitze seems extraneous; if Ya'akov went to Charan, he had obviously left Beer Sheva. Rashi explains that a tzaddik's exit from a locale leaves an impression on those who remain behind.
The Kli Yakar wonders why we don’t find the word Vayeitze in reference to Avraham and Yitzchak; why did their departures not leave a noticeable impression? He offers two explanations to answer this question according to Rashi. The simple reading of the text would be that since Yitzchak and Rivkah remained in Beer Sheva, one might have thought that the void formed by Ya'akov’s leaving would not have been so severe. The Torah, therefore, specifically tells us that Ya'akov "went out," creating a vacuum. According to this understanding, the reason that the Torah doesn’t say Vayeitze Avraham or Vayeitze Yitzchak is that when they left with their families no tzaddikim were left behind. The Torah need not inform us that their departures impacted the now tzaddik-less city; one would never have thought otherwise. Alternatively, Ya'akov's departure was uniquely sensed, because he left behind tzaddikim, his parents Yitzchak and Rivkah, who appreciated the effect of his absence. When Avraham and Yitzchak left, however, they took their whole families, leaving behind none to perceive and mourn the loss.
The Bais Halevi offers another reason for the pasuk's superfluity in using both the words Vayeitze and Vayeilech. The pasuk is trying to emphasize the dual aspect of Ya'akov's mission. Usually, a person leaving home is either running away from something, with no particular destination, or attempting to reach a specific endpoint, with no particular desire or need to leave. Rivkah told Ya'akov to run away before Eisav killed him, while Yitzchak ordered him Ya'akov to go to Charan and find a wife. The Torah tells us Vayeitze and Vayeilech to show that Ya'akov went with the intention of fulfilling both of his parents’ charges, escaping Eisav and reaching Lavan's town, truly fulfilling his obligation of kibbud av v'em.
Tell It Like It Is
Ely Landman
In response to Yaakov's complaint that Lavan had unfairly switched daughters on him, Lavan responds "Such is not done in our place, to give the younger before the elder." The Tosefes Brachah, a work by the author of the Torah Temimah, quotes the Tosfos in Kiddushin 52a who deals with a case where a man betrothed one of two sisters who were minors by giving the kesef kiddushin to their father. The man didn't specify, however, which girl he intended to betroth. Rabbeinu Tam ruled, without any doubt in the matter, that the man was married to the older sister, due to our pasuk of "Such is not done in our place…"
The Tosefes Brachah questions Rabbeinu Tam's derivation of this halachic principle from an expression uttered by the likes of Lavan HaRasha. He finds the answer in the Rambam's commentary to the first chapter in Pirkei Avos: "Kibel mimi she'amru" - we must accept truths independent of their source.
Interestingly, from this same pasuk, the medrash learns that minhagim are so powerful that they have the strength to override halachah. This pasuk teaches us, on the one hand, to be open to the truth despite its source. Concurrently, it stresses to us the importance of minhag. Thus, even when we open ourselves up to ideas around us, we must not allow these ideas to weaken our commitment to tradition. |